Huqqot
HaGoyim
In last week’s halakhah, I mentioned the concept of huqqot hagoyim, in the context
of suggesting that praying without a yarmulke (for a man) might actually be prohibited
because it is a non-Jewish practice to insist on bare heads when praying. I thought it
would be worth our while to spend a little more time discussing the prohibition of huqqot
hagoyim, since, despite the problems in defining it, it is a Torah prohibition.
Since this issur fundamentally warns against adopting the ways of the non-Jews, it
became the topic of multiple discussions, leading to a wealth of opinions (or a welter, if
one is trying to summarize them briefly) about what does and does not fit into the
prohibition. There were two main ways of viewing the prohibition: Rambam seems to have
categorically prohibited adopting non-Jewish ways, such that he prohibits Jews from
adopting outward non-Jewish practices suchas dress, hairstyle, style of architecture in
public places— in the same way that Jews are not supposed to think and believe as
non-Jews. In that version of the prohibition, there would have been room to rule that Jews
must make a specific effort to appear different from non-Jews, even in their value-neutral
activities. If non-Jews cut their hair a certain way, Jews should not. If non-Jews dress a
certain way, Jews should not. (Following that view might explain, for example, why a Jew
would choose to wear a style of clothing that is not particularly Jewish but clearly sets
him apart from the surrounding non-Jews).
The Shulhan Arukh, however, adopts the position of Maharik, who enunciates a two-tiered
test for whether a practice should be considered a hoq hagoyim or not. First, he says that
those actions of non-Jews that have no good reason for them qualify for the issur,
stressing the term hoq in the Torah, which generally indicates a practice whose reason is
not immediately obvious. If the non-Jews, then, customarily wear heavy coats in the
winter, Maharik would see no reason for Jews to differentiate themselves, either by not
wearing coats or by insisting on finding different styles of coat to wear. If, however,
the non-Jewish practice has no clear reason to it, Maharik would see a problem, since by
following that practice, the Jew is adopting a non-Jewish practice without the
justification that he (or she) is doing it to achieve the desired end. Maharik also
assumes that if the practice has no obvious reason yet non-Jews adopt it, we should assume
a hidden reason that connects to non-Jewish ideals.
The other factor Maharik raises is if the practice in question is contradictory to
Jewish values, particularly in the realm of modesty and inappropriate sexuality. There,
too, the prohibition of huqqot hagoyim would come into play. That would mean that any mode
of dress or style of dance (to pick two obvious examples) geared towards arousing sexual
feelings are not only a breach of the spirit of modesty that is supposed to characterize
the Jewish people, but are probably a violation of a Torah prohibition. Maharik applies
this to haircuts as well-- the gemara gives the example of men who shave the sides of
their head, leaving the middle to grow (like a Mohawk) or those who shave from one ear to
the other, leaving hair in front and back. Other examples mentioned in men’s
hairstyles are letting one’s hair grow long, for the pride of one’s hair, which
can also be a problem of huqqot hagoyim.
One important exception to huqqot hagoyim is somebody who needs to dress like the
non-Jews in order to be able to serve in the king’s court. Presumably, this
permission stems both from the obvious fact that he is not dressing like the non-Jews for
the sake of it, but rather that he needs to dress in that way in order to serve in the
king’s court. It is probably also true that the service in the king’s court was
seen as inherently valuable, since that person could then wield influence on behalf of the
Jewish people if necessary. I should mention that in the Spanish Jewish communities of the
Middle Ages, when many Jews were serving in the court, their mixing with the non-Jews
produced results and attitudes that not all rabbinic figures were comfortable with; while
there may not have been a technical violation of huqqot hagoyim (although it seems there
was even that), there certainly was an adopting of non-Jewish ideas and ideals, at least
part of what the prohibition hoped to prevent.
It also seems to be true that once a practice becomes widely accepted among Jews, even
if its origin was in huqqot hagoyim, it might then become more permissible for other Jews
to engage in as well. Some examples where there is debate but are worth considering: some
prohibit having a non-Jewish name, others see the name as simply a convenience for
operating in the business world, but make sure to give their child a Jewish name as well,
and a third group would give an Anglicized Hebrew name (such as Isaac), but not a
non-Jewish name. Again, if the Jewish community at large has already forsaken the custom
of Jewish names only, it might no longer be huqqot hagoyim. R. Ovadia Yosef has a long
teshuva in which he permits placing flowers on a coffin, although he notes that the late
R. Zolty (Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem) believed that to be prohibited. It is the kind of
issur that should be considered on numerous occasions, although in each one there might be
room to rule permissively. Shabbat Shalom.
IF YOU NOTICE ANY ERRORS IN THIS PRESENTATION, PLEASE BRING
THEM TO MY ATTENTION. |
