A few weeks ago, in a discussion of Bat Mitsvah, I mentioned the mitsvah of hinukh, educating our children. I thought it would be worth our while to spend a week discussing that obligation in further detail. The fundamental distinction in the mitsvah of hinukh is between mitsvot, commandments to perform and issurim, prohibitions. The standard for mitsvot is the child’s readiness and ability to understand the commandment in question. In the gemara’s phrasing, when a child learns to speak the parent is supposed to teach him "Torah tsivah lanu Moshe," when he is able to carry a lulav, the parent should buy him one, etc. In positive terms, then, the parental obligation is to introduce a child to each mitsvah as soon as it might be relevant to that child.

The only additional note I would append is R. Moshe Feinstein ztllh"h’s firm belief that hinukh in mitsvot cannot involve an incorrect form of the mitsvah. For example, the lulav and etrog sets that are sometimes offered as "hinukh" sets are only useful if they conform to halakhic standards; otherwise, the child is being taught how not to fulfill the mitsvah, not how to fulfill it. Another interesting example is his objection to coeducation even at younger ages, since he was opposed to it at older ages. Even without accepting his view of coeducation, it points out that the obligation of hinukh includes teaching the child the correct way to perform the mitsvah in all of its facets.

For prohibitions, the picture is much more complicated. The gemara’s firmest statement about the issue is that a katan okhel neveilot ein beit din metsuvin le-hafrisho, beit din is not obligated to stop a minor who is eating even Torah-prohibited foods. (That reminds us that in former times it was the responsibility of beit din, or some other central communal authority, to stop adults who were sinning in public.) The Shulhan Arukh records that ruling, but adds that the father (or parent, according to the authorities who include the mother in the obligation) is required to stop the child from doing so.

Rema adds the words "in a Torah-ordained prohibition," which suggests a distinction between Torah-ordained and Rabbinic prohibitions in the parent’s responsibility to stop the child from violation. The Mishnah Berurah explains the distinction fairly technically, that the beit din would only upbraid parents who regularly ignored their children violating Torah commandments, but not Rabbinic ones. That suggests that the parents have an absolute responsibility to stop their children from violating the Torah’s commandments, but are given the right to phrase that in a way appropriate to the child. The beit din’s not stopping the child themselves, then, is in recognition of the different possible ways of communicating the same message to various children. The content of the message, however, has to be the same for all, that it is prohibited for Jews to violate the Torah. (The Mishnah Berurah, who mounted a personal and lifelong war on lashon hara, prohibited gossip, here bemoans parents’ failure to teach their children about these prohibitions). The concession made for children was that the beit din would allow parents to find the proper way to stop their children from violating Rabbinic prohibitions.

To explain why beit din would treat the categories differently, the Mishnah Berurah cites the Vilna Gaon, who explained that under certain circumstances (if the child has a particular need) we are allowed to actually give the child the Rabbinically prohibited material ourselves. The reason for that leniency is that there was a minority opinion that believed that we are allowed to give minors any Rabbinically prohibited materials, even without a pressing need. Although we do not rule that way in general, we could rely on it in cases of distinct need. Since this is so, the beit din has to leave it up to the parents to determine the level of need.

We also rely on that minority view to allow giving children items that some view as permitted and some see as Rabbinically prohibited. Even if those who prohibit are in the majority, we combine the view that we may give children Rabbinically prohibited stuff (in general) with the view that this particular item is in fact permitted, and thus allow the child to have it. If there was a food, for example, that modern authorities debated as to whether it was Rabbinically prohibited (perhaps a Scotch that some authorities permit but the majority do not), we could give that food to a child.

An interesting theoretical element to this discussion is whether it reveals inherent differences between Torah-ordained and Rabbinically mandated prohibitions. Some authorities believe that when the Torah prohibits an object, it creates an issur heftsa, it changes the object itself into an item of prohibiton. Hazal, however, only created issurei gavra, people-related prohibitions. Food that is Rabbinically prohibited is no different essentially from regular food, it is just that as Jews who follows Hazal’s directions, we are not allowed to eat it.

Daf Yomi