Maharal on Avot-- Pereq 2, Mishnah 1

To appreciate Maharal’s presentation of this Mishnah, we really need to read the Mishnah on our own and see the many problems it raises. The Mishnah quotes Rebbe (the name given to Rabbi Judah haNasi, credited with collecting various proto-Mishnaic material, and producing the corpus of the Mishnah from it—in honor of his achievement, he is known as Rebbe, Our Teacher) as saying

"What is the derekh yesharah (literally, the straight path) that a person should choose? That which benefits the person who performs the action as well as bringing praise from others. And be as careful about a light mitsvah as about a stringent one, for you do not know the gift/reward (matan sekharan) of mitsvot. And calculate the loss of a mitsvah against its reward, and the reward of a sin against its loss. And look at three things and you will not come to sin: Know that which is above you, an Eye that Sees, an Ear that Hears, and all your actions are recorded in the Book."

Even a cursory reading of the Mishnah raises several questions, to which we can add several that Maharal raised. First, why does the second chapter begin with Rebbe; in reality, he (or his son, quoted in the next Mishnah) are the last members of the chain of tradition that the first chapter was concerned with presenting, so why was he left for the second chapter? Second, what do we mean by a derekh yesharah—why not just ask which derekh a person should choose? Third, if we really do not know the reward for mitsvot, what do we mean by a light or a stringent mitsvah? Fourth, if we do not know that reward, how can we calculate the profit of a mitsvah against its loss? Fifth, didn’t Antignos warn us against having the reward for mitsvot in mind in our performance of them—how can Rebbe urge us to keep that very reward in mind? Sixth, what are the anthropomorphic references to God doing in the Mishnah, why refer to an ayin roah, etc.?

BREAKING UP THE CHAPTERS

The point about the placement of Rebbe in the second pereq is more of a stylistic than a substantive one, but it shows an awareness of structure on Maharal’s part that is interesting. In asking the question, Maharal is assuming that Avot was fairly carefully structured, and so there must be a reason for the fairly odd division of chapters (as we’ll see in his answer, he assumes that structure for the third chapter as well). He may be right, but his predecessors did not conceive of Avot that way, and therefore did not ask that type of question.

Maharal’s answer is that Rebbe is speaking very generally, which make his statements good ones to use to open a chapter. Similarly, the third chapter starts with Aqavya b. Mahalel listing a different set of three considerations that protect a person from sin. In each case, Maharal says, the generality of their concerns is what justifies placing them first in the pereq.

"GOOD" AND "STRAIGHT"—WHICH IS OBJECTIVE AND WHICH SOCIAL?

Maharal relates the word yesharah to an interesting debate between R. Yishmael and R. Aqiva in the Sifre. On the verse "ve-`asita hayashar ve-hatov, and you shall do the straight and the good," the two Tannaim agree that one word means that which is objectively good, while the other means that which people will laud. They disagree about which is which. Maharal suggests that yesharah here means socially lauded (since that is what Rebbe is stressing—his phrasing of the question, in Maharal’s reading, actually contains the seeds of his answer), R. Aqiva’s opinion. Then, in a couple of Mishnayot, when R. Yohanan b. Zakkai questions his students as to the derekh tovah that a person should choose, he actually means the objectively good path, rather than the socially lauded one. The interesting point is not so much the claim about R. Yohanan and Rebbe as the careful attention he paid to the adjectives used for derekh in the two Mishnayot.

CHOOSE IN MIDDOT, ADHERE CAREFULLY TO MITSVOT

At first Rebbe refers to choosing a path, but then he warns us to be as careful about light mitsvot as about stringent ones. Maharal explains that the first clause of the Mishnah was discussing middot, traits of character and courses of action that are not specifically delineated by the Torah. Once Rebbe began discussing mitsvot, however, he could not suggest that some were more important than others, or that people have the right to pick and choose among their mitsvah performances.

DO WE KNOW THE REWARD OF MITSVOT?

Rebbe claims that we have to be equally careful about all mitsvot, because we do not know the reward given for them. In his phrasing of the issue, Rebbe seems to recognize the existence of "light" and "stringent" mitsvot, but denies that that status has any connection to the reward given for them.

GEMARA IN HULLIN—AT LEAST THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF MITSVOT

One problem with that claim is a gemara in Hullin which notes that the Torah specifically mentioned the reward for the mitsvah of shiluah haken, sending away a mother bird before taking the eggs or chicks from her nest. The gemara says that the Torah chose to mention the reward for this mitsvah to allow for an argument a fortiori, a qal va-homer, to all other mitsvot. If such a simple mitsvah as shiluah haken merits such a reward (length of days), how much more so the others? Embedded in that argument, however, is the assumption that we can deduce the relative value of mitsvot.

MIDRASH TANHUMA—GOD WANTED A MIX, NOT JUST THE IMPORTANT ONES

On the other hand, a Midrash Tanhuma that likens God’s decision to withhold information from us as to the mitsvot’s relative importance seems to point the other way. The Midrash tells of a king who wanted to have an orchard planted, and worried that the gardeners would only plant one type of tree. He therefore did not announce how much he would pay for each tree, to achieve a well-mixed orchard. That Midrash certainly assumes (according to Maharal) that we do not know the relative value of each of the mitsvot. [That Midrash is also quoted by Rashi and Rabbenu Yonah, and I would just point out that in fact the Midrash assumes that some mitsvot are more valuable to God than others, just that the ideal of a potpourri of mitsvot was of even greater importance.]

Because of his qualms on the issue, Maharal reads the words she-‘I atah yode`a matan sekharan shel mitsvot, for you don’t know the gift/reward of mitsvot" as a statement of their magnitude, not their relative standing. In Maharal’s reading, the Mishnah means to stress that the reward for even the smallest mitsvah is greater than we can possibly imagine. We may, indeed, know which mitsvot are more or less important to God, but we cannot imagine the greatness of reward awaiting even the smallest of our mitsvot, so we should be exceedingly careful to perform even the most (apparently) insignificant ones.

TWO KINDS OF REWARD FOR MITSVOT

Another part of the phrase—the term "matan sekharan, the gift of the reward"—provides Maharal with another avenue of explanation for this question. Maharal notes that what differentiates mitsvot is not purely objective. While Shabbat, for example, might be more significant a mitsvah than the commandment to pick up a lulav on Sukkot, each mitsvah is also colored by the amount of effort invested by the person performing a mitsvah. If a person has to travel far to attain a lulav, or stretch finances to purchase it, that adds to the value of the mitsvah, and God rewards that effort separately from the act itself. That reward—the reward for the effort—Maharal believes the Mishnah terms "matan sakhar, the gift reward" meaning reward that does not stem directly from the act itself.

HEVE MEHASHEV—THE PROFIT/LOSS VERSION OF KIYYUM HAMITSVOT

The next clause of the Mishnah recommends weighing the loss incurred in performing a mitsvah (either monetary or pleasure) against the gain (the reward God gives) and vice verse for sins. That seems to contradict Antignos’ order to worship God with no thought of reward. Maharal points out, however, that Rebbe was simply recommending a way to conquer one’s evil inclination. Since the yetser hara works on a profit/loss standard, pushing us away from mitsvot because of the loss of pleasure or money involved, and towards sin because of the financial gain or physical enjoyment to be had, we need to operate with it on its own terms. In an objective sense, however, we should be working towards Antignos’ goal.

HISTAQEL BI-SHLOSHAH DEVARIM—REMINDERS THAT PROTECT FROM SIN

The Mishnah then lists "three things" that protect from sin, but they all seem to be one, knowing what is Above (God). Maharal explains that each one is a different aspect of God, with the Eye referring to God’s knowledge of what happens on Earth (the reference to a singular Eye is meant, in Maharal’s view, to forestall the error that a physical eye is what is meant here), the Ear meaning that God pays attention to these events, and the Book means that all these actions are recorded for a later accounting. These three—God’s knowledge, interest, and the reward and punishment for actions—are, in Maharal’s view, the basis for all religiosity, so that Rebbe has managed to effectively encapsulate the fundamental drives to religiosity in one short statement.

MITSVOT AND THEIR IMPACT—ON THE WORLD, ON OUR SOULS