Rambam wants to discuss theodicy in this chapter, but-- as we will see-- that takes him into a detour about Providence (which parts of the world God Knows and has impact on). In this chapter, he explains how the problem of theodicy has led philosophers to espouse wrong notions about God.

THEODICY—TSADIQ VE-RA LO

The problem of theodicy is one we know of in Judaism as tsaddiq ve-ra lo, rasha ve-tov lo, a righteous man who has bad things happen to him, or an evil one who has good things happen to him. In each case, the world does not seem to reward or punish people according to their actions.

This problem, Rambam says, led philosophers to a logical error. The philosophers correctly noted that either God knows of events in this world or does not know of them. From that correct premise they then point out that if God knows of events in this world, one of three propositions is true: 1) He runs the world in the best possible way. 2) He cannot affect events in this world, so that He watches helplessly while justice is perverted. 3) He could make the world run better, but chooses not to out of some perversity of character.

From these three propositions, the philosophers eliminate two, namely that God perversely ignores His ability to improve the world (which is impossible as a statement about a perfect Being), or that He is unable to change what goes on in the world (which would violate the notion of omnipotence). That leaves, in the philosophers' view, two options: The world we live in is ordered as perfectly as possible, or God does not know of events in this world.

Since these philosophers are sure that this world is not perfectly ordered-- after all, there is the problem of theodicy-- they conclude that God must not know of events in this world. While that at first glance violates His omniscience, these philosophers explain that events of this world are beneath Him, rather than that He is unable to perceive them.

THE ERROR OF THE PHILOSOPHERS

Rambam points out that these philosophers have erred in two different ways. First, in deciding that the world is clearly not well-ordered, they have judged the world and God's role in it on the basis of our perception of the world, an error they (the philosophers) pointed out to others many times. Rambam notes that he has discussed this issue before (he means in chapter 12, where he fundamentally denied the existence of evil, as we saw together; in Rambam's explanation, most of what we see as evil is just the outcome of having a physical component to being).

Beyond that error, the philosophers then had to justify their claim that God does not know all of what is happening on Earth. He notes several of their suggestions, all of which revolve around the claim that there is something about this world that makes it beneath God's worth to note and pay attention.

From there, opinions about God's knowledge proliferated-- some believed God knows species but not individuals, some thought humans but not animals, etc. Rambam notes that some philosophers who preceded Alexander of Aphrodisias (his source for these views) did agree with the Torah's view of providence. In any case, with the discussion of theodicy having led to the question of God's knowledge, Rambam decides to review the opinions on that topic in chapter 17.

CHAPTER 17

Rambam notes there are five views of providence (in general, not just among philosophers).

FIRST, there are those who believe that there is no governance of the world, no design, no method to its madness. Rambam connects this view to Epicurus (eat, drink, and be merry, etc.), and notes that Aristotle had already refuted it (from the argument from design-- that the world is too ordered for there not to have been a Mover who put it into place. More formally, Aristotle noted that everything on Earth has a cause, so that it would be necessary for there to have been a first cause.

SECOND, there is the view of Aristotle. Let us recall (from earlier in the third section) that Aristotle believed that some parts of the world—the celestial spheres—are eternal. What happens on Earth (which is referred to as the sublunar realm, because Aristotle believed that the spheres encompassed everything up until the moon) is ephemeral and transitory, but the celestial realm is eternal. For Aristotle, we should note, the notion of God is as Prime Mover rather than Creator per se. That is, for Aristotle, God did not put together those spheres, but God is the ultimate cause of their existence. Again, cause in that sentence does not mean what it ordinarily does. Aristotle proved the existence of God by noting that everything has a cause; he then asserted that there must be a prime cause, which he identified as God.

Aristotle’s views create all sorts of problems for believing Jews, although some contemporary scholars think Rambam secretly held Aristotle’s position, despite repeated claims on his part that he followed the traditional view of beriah yesh me-ayin, Creation of the world after absolute nothingness.

I reviewed these ideas because Aristotle’s view of providence is directly connected to his view of Creation. In Aristotle’s picture (and here Rambam more clearly rejects Aristotle’s ideas), God’s providence extends to all those parts of Creation that are eternal, with overflow to those parts of Creation that receive overflow from the eternal parts. So, just like all the celestial realm is eternal, so too, it receives God’s providence (here, at least as Rambam uses the term, providence might mean more than knowledge, it seems to mean receiving input and abundance from God).

Some parts of the sublunar world, however, also benefit from that abundance coming from God. Most specifically, the existence of species was generally believed to be eternal and that the individual members of a species displayed characteristics that were geared towards the survival of the species. In those realms where this was true, the members of the species were exhibiting the overflow of the providence from God to the celestial realm.

Rambam notes that this view really is summed up in the verse "Azav Hashem Et haAretz." In this view—close to the 18th century theory known as Deism—God is in some sense the Cause of the Universe’s existence, but mostly in terms of guaranteeing its continuity, in that all those parts of the Universe that are permanent (the celestial realm, and the species of the sublunar realm) benefit from His providence, but there is no interaction, no involvement of God in anything having to do with human affairs. Providence exists, but highly removed from anything we would experience.

The THIRD opinion goes to the other extreme of the first opinion. Remember that the first opinion was that there is no plan for the world, no design, etc. In the third opinion, everything in this world is determined by God, including human actions. In this view, when a butterfly flaps its wings, a leaf falls, a person stands up or sits down, God has decided that all those things should occur. I would note that, although Rambam does not say this, there are many Jews who believe this, or something asymptotically close to it.

The main flaw with this theory is that it denies freewill, and with it risks the legitimacy of reward and punishment. To the extent that people are unable to make their own choices—and this, by the way is the problem with many versions (but not all) of psychology for religious Jews—they cannot be held responsible for their actions. If that is true, however, the rewards and punishments the Torah lists and, indeed, the whole notion of a future final judgement, become logically untenable. How could God punish or reward someone who was simply coerced by the dictates of Divine Providence?

Rambam notes that those who adhere to this view simply say that that was the way God willed it. We will see, be-ezrat Hashem, another example of a view that says that God runs the world in ways that we cannot explain when we come to ta`amei hamitsvot, the reasons for the commandments, in about 8 chapters of the Moreh. In any case, that is the third view.

I should note that in the late 14th century, R. Hasdai Crescas outlined a theory where he largely adopted this view of human freewill. In R. Hasdai’s view, human beings really simply respond to the various inputs they have had (close to what a behavioral psychologist might say, that we simply respond to stimuli, and if an outside observer knew all the stimuli in a person’s past and present, the observer could predict his actions accurately). In his view, reward and punishment are not so much reactions to people’s actions as attempts to help shift the scales in favor of taking the good course of action. Of course, R. Hasdai tries to carve out a small piece of the process that includes human freewill, since otherwise there is no choice to influence, it’s all just a computer program of stimulus response. I believe—and I believe that most scholars believe—that he failed to articulate a convincing element of freewill in his view.

We still have two more views of providence (the fifth is what Rambam describes as the position of the Law, meaning tradition’s view) and then Rambam shares his own thoughts. It’s going to be a big week next week, so rest up and we’ll delve into it then.