TWO FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES TO THE MITSVOT

Beginning his actual discussion of the reasons for the mitsvot, Rambam promotes two concepts: the welfare of the body and the welfare of the soul. The welfare of the body really means social welfare, the ability of humans to leave peaceably, comfortably, and productively with each other. There are two parts to that: making laws that guarantee that people won’t harm each other in any way and promoting the development of character traits that will help people be upstanding citizens. (one of the aspects of rambam’s presentation that you might want to track is whether he thinks character is a good of its own or useful only for the welfare of society). Welfare of the soul, which Rambam characterizes as the clearly higher goal of the two, consists of developing correct opinions, by which Rambam means an ever more sophisticated understanding of God ( to the extent possible). Since many people are not ready for truths about God—Rambam is an unapologetic elitist when it comes to people’s capabilities—some of the Laws that promote that correct knowledge come in the form of parables, meaning their message is hidden within an apparently meaningless act.

THE ORDER OF THE PERFECTIONS

While the second perfection is the more important of the two, it is still necessarily second. That is, Rambam states explicitly that people cannot achieve the welfare of the soul without having a healthy body and all of their physical needs taken care of. As Rambam puts it, when a person is hungry or cold or in other forms of discomfort, it is impossible to absorb true understanding of anything about God. (I suspect this may also apply to character—a person who is not in control of their character, or has serious flaws of character cannot truly absorb truths about God). Rambam assumes that that physical perfection (meaning being well taken care of) can only happen in the context of society (he quotes Aristotle’s well-known claim that people are political by nature, meaning they need to live in a polis, a city or society). That means, then, that without developing a well-run society, perfection of the soul is a distant dream.

The second perfection is basically having correct opinions about God, a challenge since Rambam is very clear that people cannot know anything directly about God. Welfare of the soul must consist, then, in developing the minimal knowledge about God we can—we’ll discuss this more in chapter 28—and understanding the world to the extent we can (since the world reveals its Creator’s touch). More interestingly (and problematically, since it leads people to error) Rambam says that perfection of the soul is an internal one, located in one’s intellect, and that there are no actions or moral qualities that are part of this perfection.

Some have taken this to mean that Rambam thinks that mitsvot, for example, are irrelevant to perfection, and that if a person developed to perfection (or achieved it) those mitsvot would no longer be necessary. I don’t think Rambam means that at all—I think he means that the perfection is internal to you, so that whatever perfection you have attained is essential to you—mitsvot are necessary to develop that perfection, and that as long as one is living they are necessary to reinforce it or to deepen it (since we never reach the ultimate perfection). But, for example, if mitsvot were necessary for that perfection in a continuing way, dead people could not retain whatever knowledge of God they had achieved, since they no longer can perform mitsvot. I believe, therefore, that Rambam is setting up a theory for the immortality of the soul (which for him revolved around intellect) rather than saying anything about the necessity of actions to self- development.

THE WONDERS OF OUR LAW

Rambam has elsewhere in the Moreh made a point of how the Torah’s Law differs from the other s in that this law cares about both perfections (where most laws are either religious or political, but not both). Rambam then derives that notion from a pasuq, and the derivation is interesting. The pasuq refers to huqqim, which as we know Rambam believes can still have a purpose and meaning to them, then the pasuq says these laws are le-Tov Lanu, for our good, lehayotenu kayom hazeh, to keep us alive this day. As Rambam notes, the gemara (on another pasuq) has interpreted the words "that it be good for you" as meaning in Olam haBa, the World to Come. Applying that gemara here (a really neat trick, because it means Rambam absorbed not only the message, but the exegesis of the gemara and applied it creatively elsewhere), Rambam says that the first clause means to give you Eternal life (which comes from the welfare of the soul) and physical life (keeping us alive in the physical sense, a result of welfare of the body).

SUMMARY

This chapter then leaves us with two important terms that we need to embed in our minds, welfare of the body (consisting of physical health, social peace, and good moral character to contribute to that peace), and welfare of the soul (developing an intellect that has correct opinions about the Creator, the World, and the Separate Intelligences).

CHAPTER 28—THE LAW MAKES SIMPLE STATEMENTS, NOT LONG ONES

Having advanced these two terms, Rambam now can point out that those broad goals of the Law should affect the way in which we seek reasons for the commandments. He first notes that the mitsvot do not tell us how to get to the correct opinions, it merely posits them. That would mean, for example, that the Torah and mitsvot don’t show us the correct way to decide that God created the world, that God has no body, etc., it simply posits those ideas through various mitsvot. Developing a sophisticated understanding (to the extent that we can) of those areas of study is part of our developing the welfare of our souls.

POLITICAL BELIEFS—A LOADED CONCEPT

Rambam also points out that some mitsvot or pesuqim advance notions that are in fact incorrect, but necessary "politically" since most people could not take the truth. The example he gives is of the notion of a God angered by our iniquities who takes vengeance for them. As we have seen many times, Rambam does not believe that God changes in time, so that our actions of sin cannot in that sense affect him. The view that He gets angry, therefore, is philosophically untrue and incorrect. Nevertheless, the Torah gives that impression and speaks in those terms because it is necessary for people to believe that to retain their religiosity.

At first glance, this sounds terribly paternalistic. Worse, it suggests (as academics have held) that once a person outgrows those beliefs, they might outgrow the texts that advanced them. Rambam seems to be saying that there are elements of the Torah that become obsolete as a person advances in sophistication.

I suspect (I cannot prove) that Rambam did not think so, that he recognized that those beliefs, like mitsvot, were necessary for all people, even the most sophisticated, because people by their natures need certain tools to fuel their religious activity. It might be, in other words, that even once I intellectually know (assuming I accept Rambam’s view) that God does not wax wroth over my sins, that I need to maintain the notion that He does as part of my yir’at shamayim.

IN WHICH MITSVOT DO I NEED TO FIND A REASON?

Since there are only 3 goals to the mitsvot, some mitsvot will fall clearly into one category or other—murder, for example, promotes social welfare by stopping people from wronging each other. Rambam says he mostly intends to explain reasons for mitsvot that do not seem to serve any particular purpose, such as the laws of mingling things, meat and milk being the best-known example, but also shatnes, sewing wool and flax together, or kilayim, planting different kinds of plants together.