AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, I HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE A BREAK IN THIS COURSE AT THE END OF JUNE. BE`EZRAT HASHEM, WE WILL COMPLETE CHAPTER 42 BY THEN. I WILL RESUME OFFERING AN E-MAIL SHIUR IN SEPTEMBER, ALTHOUGH I PLAN TO OFFER ONLY TWO: HALAKHAH IN BRIEF AND ONE OTHER. FOR THE OTHER, THE CHOICES WILL PROBABLY BE 1)CONTINUE MAHARAL (DOING THE 4TH AND 5TH CHAPTERS OF AVOT), 2)CONTINUE MOREH NEVUKHIM UNTIL THE END (FALL ONLY, WITH SPRING TO BE DECIDED), 3)MISHLE—PROBABLY AN ANALYSIS OF R. SAADYA GAON’S VIEW OF THE BOOK, 4)PEREK HELEK (THE LAST CHAPTER OF SANHEDRIN, DEALING WITH VARIOUS AREAS OF JEWISH BELIEF). THE CHOICE WILL DEPEND SOLELY ON WHICH COURSE GETS THE MOST REGISTRATION BEFORE JULY 31ST.

CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION OF PIDYON BEKHOR

Last week, we saw Rambam discuss the requirement to sacrifice the firstborn of animals as a way to remember the miracles of Egypt. He had noted that the particular species of animals the Torah delineates were the one most commonly found in people’s possession. What he now needs to explain is the requirement to break the neck of an unredeemed firstborn donkey—really, though, Rambam believes that it was just a way for the Torah to strongly encourage its redemption, by making sure the owner would not gain anything by refusing to redeem it.

THE SABBATICAL YEAR

The next set of laws that Rambam addresses are the requirements of the shemittah and yovel, the Sabbatical years. There are four main laws in these years: 1) leaving the land fallow, as well as not collecting its harvest, 2)forgiving all debts, 3) freeing Hebrew slaves, even those who have voluntarily committed to permanent slavery, and 4) returning land to its original owner. The first category Rambam explains as teaching us generosity for all people, by our once every seven years being willing to allow all people to take from our fields without blocking them. In terms of letting the land lie fallow, Rambam says that is good for the land and rejuvenates it.

Note, however, that he slips this explanation in, when his context is that all these laws teach us empathy and generosity. To teach us generosity, the Torah could have allowed us to till and plant in the seventh year, just requiring that we share our harvest with whoever wants it. Rambam has therefore recognized another extraneous element to these laws, although he does not stress it. I have no thoughts on whether he knew what he was doing, or that this was just an insignificant detail so he did not feel the need to adjust his framework to fit it.

Forgiving all debts and freeing Hebrew slaves is more clearly an example of furthering our sense of benevolence towards others, in this case the poor and the enslaved. Finally, the requirement to return land was a way of insuring that there would be a mechanism of earning a living for people in general. Meaning, even if poverty forced a family to sell its land, the family at least knew that in a limited number of years that land would return to them and they would once again be able to be economically independent. Here again, the reason Rambam suggests for the mitsvah seems not to fit his broader framework—it seems more a reason of social utility than of instilling important qualities of character. That might be a misimpression, however, since the notion of insuring a person’s livelihood is an example of benevolence in Rambam’s view—see our comments below in the section entitled LENDER—BORROWER.

GENEROSITY TOWARDS THE TEMPLE

The next group of laws that Rambam discusses are those that deal with making donations to the Temple, either by declaring something herem, in which case it goes to the kohanim, or by donating it to bedek habayit, for the financial support of repair of the Temple. Having such institutions for donation, Rambam suggests, instills the quality of generosity, and teaches people not to be miserly. Most of the evil that is found in cities, he believes, comes from the desire to gain possessions, so that by instilling the quality of giving to the Temple, God helps us restrain those desires.

Note that the quality of generosity described here is more the negative of the quality of acquisitiveness than the usual way we think of it. Ordinarily, generosity means a willingness to give to others in need; here, it means a willingness to part with one’s possessions for any good cause. Rambam also ignores the possible value in supporting the Temple, as a recognition of the value the Temple provides for the Jewish people. I might, in other words, have explained the laws of donations as teaching us the value of supporting the Temple, and showing us different mechanisms for providing for its gracious upkeep.

LENDER-BORROWER

These laws, as well, teach benevolence in pity (Rambam does not elaborate, but I assume he means that in regulating the way lenders treat borrowers, we remind the wealthy that the poor, for all that they are in current need of money, still deserve our respect and empathy). In particular, Rambam singles out the rules of not taking as collateral a tool that this person needs for his livelihood; this reminds me of Rambam’s notion in the Mishneh Torah that the highest form of tsedakkah is guaranteeing a person’s means of earning a living before they end up needing formal charity. In the collateral case as well, Rambam is noting the Torah’s concern with allowing the maximum possible opportunity for this person to earn a living on his or her own.

NON-JEWISH SLAVES

The qualities of benevolence in the laws of slaves manifest themselves in two main ways for Rambam. First, he notes the rules about mutilation of the slave—if the owner causes the loss of any part of the slave’s body (even a tooth) the slave goes free. Along the same lines, the tools an owner is allowed to use to beat his slave are limited to a whip or a stick—tools that are used to hit, but not to maim or to kill. The point is that, accepting the legitimacy of an owner’s disciplining a slave physically, Rambam sees benevolence within the Jewish system of ownership. We nowadays think of adults disciplining other adults physically with horror, but in Rambam’s time (and both before and after), the idea that some adults were at a higher level of sophistication/intelligence was widely accepted. Within such a system, to allow a "higher" person to discipline a "lower" one was not as horrifying as it sounds today.

A further law regarding such slaves, in Rambam’s explanation, not only teaches the quality of benevolence in intellectual terms, but forces us to act on that theory, thus instilling the quality in the fiber of our beings. If a slave escapes from its owner, the Torah forbids us from returning him to his state of slavery. We must not only protect the fleeing slave from his master, we have to allow him to set up residence in our midst, and not mistreat him either verbally or physically. In requiring us to act thus towards members of the lowest social class, Rambam points out, the Torah is showing us the mode of behavior we should be adopting towards all those who need our help and protection.

PITY FOR WRONGDOERS—IS IT PITY?

Rambam contrasts everything he has written in the chapter thus far with the rules that apply to sinners and wrongdoers. There, even if they seek our protection, we are not allowed to give it. As opposed to pagans or the ignorant who make a value out of friendship itself, meaning the willingness to stand by and defend someone regardless of their actions, the Torah requires that we give such a person up for judgement. To make that point, the Torah tells us, me-im mizbehi tikahenu lamut, that we must even remove a person from the Temple if that is where he has sought sanctuary. Pitying such a person is actually acting cruelly to society in general, since the refusal to prosecute evildoers condones the actions of the wrongdoer (along the lines of an overconcern with the rights of criminals at some point leading to a devaluation of the rights of victims). The middle road is to vigorously protect those who are blameless and need our help, while still recognizing our need to punish wrongdoers appropriately.