REASONS FOR RULES OF PROPERTY

The commandments in the 7^th class, as Rambam notes, are those that have to do with property. He also points out—I note it because it is interesting to watch Rambam compare this categorization with the one in the Mishneh Torah; there are interesting articles written (and still more to be written) discussing the differences and similarities in these categorizations—that some of these rules are explained in Sefer Shoftim and some in Kinyan in the Mishneh Torah.

Before we look at Rambam’s actual explanations, it is worth pointing out that we could have imagined this being a very short chapter. Every society needs rules of property to make sure that people don’t steal from each other, and so on. Rambam notices that element of the rules (for those of you with long memories, this was the kind of explanation that would promote shlemut haguf, perfection of the body, whether individual or communal), but also adds a component to these rules that we would think of as moral.

HOW MUCH PROFIT TO TAKE?

In rules of buying and selling, there are somewhat obvious rules about fraud and swindling. More interesting to me is Rambam’s mention of the rules of ona’ah, where a person takes more than the permitted percentage of profit. Rambam explains it as requiring that people only take the habitual level of profit, but that is clearly not a sufficient explanation. If the only issue were "habitually recognized," then if a society (such as America) allowed for as much profit as buyers are willing to pay, that should be acceptable. Even accepting Rambam’s premise that ona’ah is teaching us about appropriate profits, it would seem more reasonable to say that the Torah wants us to learn that more than a certain percentage of profit is objectively unreasonable.

If that is the Torah’s perspective, the question of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews becomes relevant. The verse in the Torah refers to ona’ah as a problem between Jews, which would mean that it is permissible to take profits over 16 2/3% from non-Jews—seemingly contradicting the Torah’s lesson about profits. We would have to say, then, that the notion of only taking a certain percentage of profits is part of a sense of community with the person with whom I am doing business. Business within my community, then, should be handled differently than business with people at large.

APPORTIONING RESPONSIBILITY IN CASES OF WATCHING

Rambam then gives the rules for the four shomrim (people who either watch or take someone else’s object) and their liability, and claims that responsibility devolves upon the person getting the main benefit out of the interaction. While that works for the shomer hinam and sho’el (the person who watches it voluntarily and the borrower), it works less well for the middle cases, the person paid a salary or the renter. In those two cases, each side receives some benefit from the interaction; therefore, each bears some responsibility. The shomer is responsible for theft or loss, since those were preventable, while the owner is responsible for circumstances beyond the shomer’s control, such as death or being taken by force.

While the Talmud does refer to the question of benefit from the transaction in terms of assigning responsibility, in these last cases that doesn’t seem to work. If the guiding principle is that both are getting benefit, then they should both share any kind of loss equally. It seems more reasonable to explain that the liability of the shomrim depends on two factors, who benefits as well as the extent to which the trustee performed his job. That latter issue, though, does not promote any broader idea Rambam could stress.

WAGES

Regarding poor people, Rambam interprets the labor laws of the Torah as looking to protect the poor (who were the ones who hired themselves out). Thus, the person has to be paid on time, not cheated, and allowed (as a kindness) to eat some of the food on which he is working. All of those are clear rules in the Torah. However, Rambam also understands the rules of wages as including paying the employee the full value of his services. The verses in the Torah refer only to the notion of not cheating the person and not delaying his payment. Rambam, however, seems to include the requirement to pay an appropriate wage (although perhaps that would be guided by market forces rather than moral virtue); that would mean that even if someone were willing to work for less than market rate, Rambam would require the employer to pay the full wage.

INHERITANCE AS A MORAL ISSUE

Rambam sees the rules of inheritance as well as teaching us moral lessons. First, he thinks these laws require us to leave an inheritance for our descendants rather than squandering our money (an interesting perspective in a country that requires the elderly to use up all their money before being eligible for Medicare). What’s interesting in that perspective is that the Torah does not say that—to read the Torah, the requirement is to handle whatever inheritance one does leave in a certain way. Rambam adds the obligation to leave an inheritance, presumably to whatever extent possible.

Second, Rambam assumes that the requirement to leave it to the nearest living relative expresses a rule that that is the person whose welfare we should be most concerned about. Instead of inheritance being automatic, then, Rambam seems to think of it as volitional, a choice the person who is dying makes (a difficult reading of the relevant halakhot, but we can leave that for another time). That notion leads him to explain that a first-born had our love before the other children came along, and therefore has rights to a double portion.

Rambam cannot mean that purely as said, since then the second born should get more than the third born, and so on. Rather, he must mean that the first born was the only at some point, and that there is a qualitative difference to the love one gives an only child than to each of one’s several children. That unique love is permanently lost when a second child comes along, and it is as compensation for that that the first-born gets the double share.

CLOSENESS TO RELATIVES

Rambam now expands this notion to a general requirement to feel close to, to seek the welfare of, and to provide assistance and succor to, one’s relatives. Inheritance, then, is not only a question of taking care of one’s immediate descendants, it is teaching a broader life principle, that we have to retain our sense of bonding to relatives. It is in that light that Rambam expresses the Talmud’s preference for marrying one’s niece—it is not that we know her genes, etc., it’s just that part of our responsibility to care for, and about, relatives, includes marrying a woman who might otherwise have trouble. That means, concomitantly, that if the niece will have no problem getting married, Rambam would see no particular merit in marrying her, an interesting claim.

EGYPTIANS AND EDOMITES

Having raised the notion of relatives and maintaining a bond with them, Rambam points out two other mitsvot that teach similar lessons. Although they do not have to do with property—at the end of the chapter, Rambam actually calls attention to his having strayed from the topic of the chapter to discuss them—the requirement not to abhor an Edomite (a descendant of Edom, another name for Yaakov’s brother Esav). As far as Rambam sees it, this is a reminder to stay aware of our relationship, however distant, with the Edomite people, as part of teaching us the importance of relatives.

To some extent, this seems an odd explanation (to me), since there are much better ways to remind us of the importance of kinship. On the other hand, the infrequency of actually having to relate to a person from Edom might mean that the Torah could make a rhetorical point without much practical ramification. The whole notion also reminds me of my grandmother, a"h, who used to keep track of relatives way down the bloodlines (so-and-so is my third cousin by marriage to my….). I used to wonder why she worked so hard at it; it turns out she had Rambam on her side.

Extending the notion of relatives, Rambam also points out that we need to remember those who have helped us in times of stress, need, etc. We are therefore required to not abhor an Egyptian, for we were strangers in their land. Even though they later turned on us, we are still obligated to remember (as part of our relating to them, and as part of our developing our character) the good they did for us.