DOWRY AS WAGES

Rambam equates the dowry promised to a woman to the wages given a hired laborer. He does not explain why they are the same, but he does use that notion to explain the punishment of the motsi shem ra. The motsi shem ra is a man who, after marrying his wife, claims that it is clear to him that she has had relations with another man. Since in those days there was a delay between erusin, the part of marriage that imposes the requirement of fidelity upon the woman, and nisuin, the part of marriage where the husband and wife begin to live together. The motsi shem ra falsely claims that the woman has had relations between the time of erusin and the time of nisuin, a claim that would deprive her of her dowry, which in the Torah’s time was fifty shekel.

If his claims turn out to be false, the Torah fines the man 100 shekel, ordains lashes for him, and prohibits him from ever divorcing the woman in question (assuming she wishes to stay). In Rambam’s view, the fine is akin to the fine we would impose upon a thief; just as the thief has to pay double what he stole, this man has to pay double what he was trying to steal from this woman. Because he attempted to humiliate her, he is humiliated by flogging. Because he tried to get rid of her in an unacceptable manner, he is forced to keep her. A similar notion explains the requirement that edim zomemim, false witnesses, are required to pay whatever they tried to take from the defendant. In each case, for Rambam, doing to the thief what he attempted to do to the other punishes theft (or attempted theft).

Rambam does not explain why in the case of motsi shem ra the fine is double, as in stealing, while in the case of false testimony payment is only the amount of the claim that was falsely made. I might speculate that Rambam saw motsi shem ra as already theft, since it is more difficult for the woman to disprove his claim than in ordinary cases, but I am not sure. Regardless of those issues, Rambam saw the similarities among these realms—false witness, motsi shem ra, and theft—as remarkable, an example of the wonder of the Torah’s laws (in their cohesiveness, their coming together into a unity). He now returns to the topic of the chapter, sexuality.

THE ARAYOT

Rambam goes into the prohibited sexual unions in some detail, but I will only mention the overall reasons he gives to explain them. First, he says that the Torah wishes in general to teach us to limit sexual intercourse. In general, the women prohibited by the Torah are those with whom a man has frequent contact, so that they would be available to him on a regular basis. Since, in Rambam’s view, the simple requirement to marry a woman before engaging in such activity is insufficient to prevent men from taking advantage of this availability, the Torah prohibited them more seriously than that. Without going into the issue more deeply, I will note that Ramban famously took issue with this view in his Torah commentary, pointing out (among other problems) that if the Torah’s wish were to limit intercourse, this would not succeed, since a man could spend his whole life involved in permitted intercourse with his wife. Rambam, obviously, did not know of Ramban’s objections, but I suspect that he would have answered that the Torah wished to limit the variety of woman he would be involved with; while a man could marry many wives, it was unlikely he would do so. If, on the other hand, he was having regular contact with many different women, and the only reason not to have intercourse with them was the `aseh obligation to be married before doing so, the man would likely transgress. If that was Rambam’s reasoning, it does explain the rules.

A second reason Rambam offers returns to the question of bloodlines. Although Rambam does not explain it fully, he mentions the notion of not having intercourse with the root and branch at the same time (or by the same person). To take one example, the prohibition of marrying a woman and her mother is (aside from the proximity issue we mentioned earlier) that it involves the root and branch (meaning the original mother and her offspring) with the same man.

This can get technical—Rambam thinks that brother and sister count as the same person in these terms, that the father’s wife is the root even if she did not bear this child, and so on—but it seems to be related to the bloodlines issue in that it insists on maintaining awareness of where in the family one lies. By engaging both root and branch in such activity, one is blurring those lines.

AVOIDING SEXUAL THOUGHTS

Rambam then mentions the prohibition against letting one’s thoughts linger over such matters. Should such a thought spring up in a person unheeded, it is that person’s obligation to find a way to distract himself from it. Rambam then cites the gemara in Kiddushin that urges such a person to go to the Beit Midrash, since Torah is an effective tool in vanquishing such thoughts. He even supports this notion by mentioning that Aristotle also denigrates the sense of touch, a sense that leads to the human interest in such activity. The idea that we should look down on, and seriously limit, our sexual sides is thus, in Rambam’s view, a notion shared by the Torah and Aristotle (meaning the highest level of insight achieved by humans unaided by the Torah’s ideals).

THE PROHIBITION OF INTERBREEDING

Rambam’s assumption that we must avoid sexual thoughts explains the Rabbinic prohibition against watching animals breed (since that might easily stimulate such thoughts in the human watching them), but more interestingly explains both the prohibition against interbreeding as well as against yoking animals of different breeds together. In the case of interbreeding, Rambam notes that such animals will not generally naturally breed with each other, so that the human owner will have to put them together, which will necessarily draw that person's attention to the activity involved. In the case of yoking animals together, Rambam again sees that as leading towards their engaging in (or their owner's deciding to engage them in) this kind of activity. All of that, and the thought of it, is what Rambam is trying to avoid unless it is necessary.

CIRCUMCISION

Rambam has an extended discussion of circumcision, most of which we will get to next week (BE"H), when we will finish chapter 49, but I wanted to begin this week with the main reason he suggests, a reason that places circumcision squarely in the flow of the other mitsvot we have been discussing, and that flies in the face of modern sensibilities. Rambam believes (he says it is the strongest reason for circucision) that circumcision is meant to lower our sexual urges. He sees the point as being to cause pain to that organ in the beginning of life, which will reduce our interest in that activity. Likewise, he notes a statement by Hazal that says that women have difficulty separating themselves from uncircumcised men, and that civcumcision is meant to reduce that factor.

Interestingly, Rambam knows of others who claimed that circumcision is a way of improving people (whereas his reason sounds like it is causing a defect). He says that the perfection is moral rather than physical. That is, by harming our sexual organs, we are actually easing our moral lives, by reducing our interest in that distracting activity. That assumes that the physical and the moral are in conflict, and that easing our morality necessarily involves reducing, or even deforming, our physicality. Later on in the chapter (next week), Rambam asserts that he believes in the mean in sexual activity, but he certainly sounds negative about it here.

A second reason he offers is that circumcision gives a physical sign for memebers of the same group to feel an affinity with each other. In this reason, circumcision is like a brand, needed for two reasons. First, since it is a physically difficult procedure, it makes sure that those who do not share the Jewish belief in monotheism will not join the nation under false pretenses (although Rambam does not mention or deal with the people of Shechem, who circumcised themselves so they could unite with Jacob and his sons for trade). Second, it means that all those who have this sign are those who believe in monotheism, and Rambam sees value in having a shared bodily sign to link us all to each other.

Rambam closes this paragraph by saying that this is also a strong reason, perhaps stronger than the first. What is odd about this is that Rambam had just said that the first reason was the strongest-- how can he offer another candidate so soon after? I suspect that Rambam liked the first reason better and was trying not to be obvious about it, since many might not be ready for its message (our own reactions to that message suggest that Rambam's fears were well founded). To help such people, Rambam offered another reason, focusing outside the realm of sexuality. Next week we'll see ideas about to how make circumcision most beneficial for those who have it done.

See you then.